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A Meaner, More 
Punitive Nation 
Bruce Berner 
President Bush's much 
burlesqued yearning for a "kinder, 
gentler nation" deserves more 
serious attention. It proceeds 
from an assumption that, collec-
tively, we are currently mean and 
punitive. But are we? What 
gauges exist to measure our mean-
ness-gentleness quotient? There 
are many symptoms, such as the 
creeping disappearance of simple 
courtesy, but I agree with the opin-
ion of deTocqueville that one of 
the clearest indicators of a soci-
ety's civility is the way it treats its 
criminals. This piece scans the 
recent American criminal punish-
ment landscape and concludes 
that the President's wish may be 
granted. We may become kinder 
and gentler because that is about 
the only direction left open. We 
have, I argue, hit near-bottom in 
mindless, punitive reaction to 
Bruce Berner, a graduate ofVU and 
member of the faculty of the School of 
Law, contributes regularly to The 
Cresset on issues of law and jurispru-
dence. 
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cnme. To demonstrate this, I dis-
cuss a series of recent cases and 
statutes. 
Before the young Republi-
cans assail this piece as the latest 
bleeding-heart entry in the war-
on-crime debate, let me suggest 
that such charge would be misdi-
rected. The issue herein is not the 
means for fighting crime. The 
events which are chronicled here 
are outside any sensible debate on 
law enforcement or penology. 
Among the justifications 
ordinarily offered for punishment 
for crime are deterrence, preven-
tion, rehabilitation, education, 
restraint, disapprobation, and 
reinforcement of norms. We can 
argue about these and redesign 
punishment as we learn more 
about them. We may choose to 
commit more or fewer resources 
to the crime problem as political 
tides ebb and flow. And, of 
course, we do. Such is the war-on-
crime debate. How many years in 
jail will most effectively prevent 
robbery? Should we throw more 
or fewer dollars in to the effort to 
rehabilitate offenders? Should we 
spend more energy on crime, 
drug, and alcohol education? 
Does the death penalty deter? 
Can people ever really change? 
0 
There remains, however, 
an undeniable, critical, aim of 
punishment variously identified as 
'just desert," "revenge," or "retri-
bution." We punish in part 
because some fundamental 
instinct tells us that deviance 
should prompt outrage which in 
turn should prompt the infliction 
of suffering on the deviant. Kant 
even had a calculus, complete with 
pluses and minuses, for exacting 
retribution. Unless and until the 
correct "payment" was made (nei-
ther too high nor too low), the 
cosmos was misaligned. We, with-
out this technical apparatu , 
ticulately sense that if cer 
conduct goes unpunished. 
world is out of whack. While l 
punishment aims, like preven 
or rehabilitation, reside in em 
cal, logical, and psycholo 1 
realms, retribution is almost.,. 
ly the product of how outraged 
feel and of our sense of pro 
tion in quenching that outra 
How much pure retribution 
demand (after we have exhau 
the preventive, educational, rc 
bilitative, etc. effects 
punishment) is a powerful bar 
eter of our collective mood. 
One final introductu 
observation. Punishment f 
crime is relatively high in the n 
ed States. Length of prison ter 
actually served for comparab 
offenses is nowhere else so hig 
The percentage of population 1 
prison is higher only in the Smi 
Union and South Africa. Th 
death penalty is abandoned in m· 
tually every other Westerr 
industrialized country. But eve 
accepting typical American pun-
ishment as a baseline, th 
following events seem to suggest 
current American retributi\ 
impulse amazing in magnitude. 
Cameron Kocher. Nin · 
year-old Cameron Kocher took hi 
father's high-powered rifle and 
killed a seven-year-old girl as sht 
whizzed by on a snowmobile. I! 
may have been an accident; it rna 
have been intentional. A jury will 
soon sort that out ~ince the Stat 
of Pennsylvania is trying Cameron 
for murder. 
Ray and Faye Copeland 
This couple is accused of thre 
murders. The State of Missoun 
seeks the death penalty. He is 75: 
she is 68. 
juvenile death penaltJ. 
Many states are imposing capital 
punishment on persons aged 16 
and 17. Some had been sentenc-
ing persons 15, 14, or younger to 
death until the Supreme Court 
The Cresset 
led the practice unconstitution-
as "cruel and unusual." 
nether or not it is cruel, it was 
t all that unusual. 
Abolition of the insanity 
fense. A large number of states 
mcluding Indiana) have virtually 
lished the defense of insanity. 
Before sorting through this, I 
oncede that these actions have 
en taken through judgments of 
few people or bodies not always 
ompletely responsive to the con-
tituencies they are supposed to 
r present. But there are so many 
ecent instances like these and so 
attle negative reaction to them 
at they can be fairly employed to 
o rtray the culture from which 
ey spring. 
None of the listed events 
an be fully explained by invoking 
deterrent, rehabilitative, or educa-
tive purposes . The idea of 
deterring Cameron or other "simi-
rly motivated" nine-year-old boys 
b.,· convicting him of murder is 
pretty bizarre. (For one thing, to 
ell a nine-year old that if he kills 
n purpose, he is a murderer, is to 
amply to him that such actions are 
ith in the realm of his choice. 
here are some nine-year olds 
t left ignorant on that point.) I 
·ouldn't want to have to argue 
that putting Cameron in jail will 
make him better. The experience 
up to now seems to have been lost 
n him. At pretrial conferences, 
he communicates (when he is 
wake) solely by tugging on his 
wyer's sleeve to ask when he can 
o home. He seems also to have 
missed a few of the more subtle 
o ral issues of his conduct and 
pcoming trial by telling all who 
em upset by this killing, "If you 
o n 't think about it, you won't be 
d." 
None of this suggests 
ihruary, 1990 
Cameron need not be dealt with. 
He needs help of all kinds and, if 
the killing was intentional, has 
needed it for a while. Family, 
church, school, counselling, the 
juvenilejustice system all may be 
appropriate. But to bring to bear 
on him the criminal justice system, 
that awesome apparatus designed 
to channel and express the moral 
condemnation of the community, 
is to seek revenge without 
thought. I have talked about this 
case with a number of child psy-
chiatrists, grade-school principals, 
and fourth-grade teachers, all peo-
ple who deal with the behavior 
and mentality of nine-year-olds 
regularly. Not one could see any 
sense in this prosecution other 
than an unreasoned manifestation 
of fear and retaliation. Cameron's 
case is not quite the fulfillment of 
the worst-case scenario, for Penn-
sylvania, as well as several other 
states, could bring the same 
charge against a child as young as 
seven. (Read my lips, "s-e-v-e-n.") 
Indiana law patiently waits until 
the child reaches ten. 
Annually in the United 
States, about 250 children under 
twelve gain access to a gun and kill 
someqne. It is a problem. Most of 
these cases are dealt with officially 
by the juvenile system. Many are 
the result of careless adults who 
may be appropriately sued civilly 
or punished criminally. Some are, 
irreducibly, the price paid for per-
mitting private weapon possession. 
As Ollie North likes to say, "It's a 
dangerous world out there." But 
let us not move toward "solving" 
this problem with the electric 
highchair. 
And in the case of the 
elderly Copelands, criminal prose-
cution is surely appropriate as is 
serious punishment if they are 
convicted. This case moves us into 
more uncertain issues of degree. I 
do not argue here that imposing 
the death penalty on the elderly is 
unjust, only that it is symptomatic 
of an extremely strong retributive 
impulse. It is akin to shooting a 
mouse with a cannon. Most seri-
ous studies cast grave doubt on 
whether the threat of capital pun-
ishment ever has measurable 
deterrent effect, and presumably 
any such effect would be dimin-
ished when aimed at persons 
nearer the end of their lives. So, 
rather than pass over the question 
with rhetoric about deterrence 
and wars on crime, let us admit 
that we need to kill people like the 
Copelands to get our fair measure 
of revenge, that imprisoning them 
for the rest of their lives is simply 
and finally not enough. 
The same analysis applies 
to executing teenagers. The only 
plausible explanation for doing it 
is to exact retributive payment. If 
we are afraid of what they may do, 
they can be restrained; we have as 
much power to deliver life sen-
tences with no prospect of release 
as we do to kill. As to deterrence 
of others, if we cannot demon-
strate that the death penalty 
influences adults, can anyone 
believe that the problem gets less 
complicated when we introduce 
the teenage mind? I've been 
unsuccessfully trying for years to 
deter my fifteen-year-old son from 
leaving his coat on the floor, 
which seems less complex than 
preventing killing. (I often won-
der if it would help if I didn't leave 
mine on the floor.) 
Even when the death 
penalty is not involved but the 
debate is over how long a prison 
term should be, Americans consis-
tently intuit a period of time long 
by any comparative standard. Law 
students often complain about 
some perpetrator of, say, a petty 
theft, "getting off with only a year 
in jail." I understand, indeed 
share, their frustration with crime, 
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but I wonder what would lead any-
one to put the word "only" in a 
sentence that contains "year in 
jail." 
The movement toward 
abolition of the insanity defense 
suggests either an unwillingness or 
an inability to distinguish illness 
from evil. If this statutory trend 
were simply a confession of inabili-
ty, abolition would be defensible 
on deterrence grounds-after all, 
insanity can be faked, so if we 
make the defense unavailable, we 
will at least deter the would-be fak-
ers. (Trying to figure out how to 
deter the truly insane will only 
make your head hurt.) Yet, there 
are a variety of ways to control the 
uncertainties of the distinction 
between illness and criminality 
without destroying the decisive 
moral difference . These may 
include: maintaining a definition 
of insanity which includes only 
gross mental illness and excludes 
neurotics and persons with per-
sonality disorders, conditions not 
only less serious, but more diffi-
cult to diagnose with accuracy; 
restricting the scope of expert psy-
chiatric testimony so that the 
ultimate question remains a moral 
one for the jury, not a "clinical" 
one for experts or pseudo-experts; 
placing the burden of proving 
insanity squarely on the defen-
dant; increasing the standard of 
proof as by requiring defendants 
to prove insanity by "clear and 
convincing evidence." The failure 
to try such intermediate steps (a 
few states have and they seem to 
work) suggests that, for many, 
there is not an inability, but an 
unwillingness, to maintain the dis-
tinction between criminality and 
illness. 
The whole theory of crim-
inal punishment, however, rests 
on the assumption that humans 
are creatures with the capacity to 
make choices. When facts demon-
strate that the choice to kill or not 
28 
is unduly compromised, we either 
applaud the choice as right Uusti-
fication defenses like self-defense) 
or recognize that to ask more of a 
person in such a position is to ask 
too much (excuse defenses like 
duress). Insanity, when properly 
defined, is the label for people 
who have so far lost the capacity to 
make choices or to discern the 
propriety of those choices that no 
criminal punishment could be 
effective or appropriate. If they 
are dangerous, we should protect 
ourselves from them. There are 
many legal and extralegal tech-
niques for this. For example, we 
quarantine those with serious, 
communicable diseases. But we 
don't view it as "punishment," we 
don't insist on visiting a criminal 
conviction on them, on announc-
ing to them that they are to be 
morally condemned. There are 
many factors in this complex ques-
tion of abolishing the insanity 
defense. One fair conclusion, 
however, is that there exists in 
America a spirit which possesses 
and indulges a willingness to 
impose punishment beyond our 
ability to account for it rationally. 
Nothing is wrong with 
righteous anger and outrage. If 
we never experienced it or acted 
on it, we would be ill, morally 
bankrupt, or in paradise. And 
clearly our institutions for chan-
neling and expressing that 
outrage are morally advanced 
from lynch mobs. But "how?" and 
"how much?" are different ques-
tions. Regardless of how 
stunned we may be at the havoc 
wreaked by nine-year-old children 
or by those with profound mental 
illness, moral outrage expressed 
by invoking the criminal process is 
inappropriate. As to other situa-
tions, in which such outrage is 
justified, we must be vigilant of 
both upper and lower boundaries 
in venting it. Too little punish-
ment risks moral decay. Too 
much risks cruelty. My the 
that the current pressure is on 
upper boundary. 
Will we become kin 
and gentler, at least in this ar 
criminal punishment? Not u 
two things happen. First, we m 
overcome the intuition that 
er and harsher punishments 
alleviate the crime problem. 
must stop blaming the fever 
the aspirin. We must cease c 
ouflaging retributive impulse ~, 
rhetoric about deterrence, edu 
tion, and "wars on crime." \ 
must, in short, own up to o 
thirst for revenge. Second, 
must want to reduce that thir 
The revenge instinct is strong; it 
probably insuperable by mer 
human effort. 
To the extent one thin 
the punishments chronicled abo 
are proportionate expression 
righteous moral outrage, it is net-
ther necessary nor advisable t 
become kinder and gentler. For 
those of us who would like to 
change, who see in ourselves mor 
thirst for revenge than we like t 
admit, we will often find changin 
very difficult. Anger and angui h 
frustration and fear are not light· 
heartedly left unrequited. The 
beasts are overcome only with pro-
found struggle. 
One helpful strategy is to fol-
low those who lead by example. 
They live in all times, culture 
and traditions. The patriarch 
Abraham, as well as Gandhi, Mar· 
tin Luther King, Jr., and Mother 
Teresa all come to mind. At ~ 
University under the cross, it 
shouldn't be too difficult to thin 
of one more. 0 
TM Cressel 
